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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to investigate memories of daily actions in checking-prone 
participants. A sample of 419 non-clinical participants completed a questionnaire evaluating 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and a questionnaire evaluating sensory details, emotions, 
vividness, confidence and memory perspective of seven everyday actions such as ‘brushing one’s 
teeth’. The main results indicated that checking was related to low levels of visual, kinaesthetic and 
spatial details in memories for actions, more negative emotions and anxiety when performing 
actions and low confidence in memory quality. In addition, checking-prone individuals more 
frequently reported their memories from the perspective of an external observer than non-checking-
prone individuals. In general, these results seem to indicate that checking is associated with 
impersonal memories for everyday actions, as well as low confidence in these memories. The role of 
anxiety is also evoked, as it was significantly related to poor memory characteristics.  
 
Several studies have investigated the possible existence of memory deficits in Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (OCD), and in particular in individuals presenting checking rituals (i.e. 
‘checkers’). More specifically, it has been hypothesised that checkers may find it difficult to figure 
out whether they have really performed an action (such as locking the door) or whether they only 
imagined it; in other words, their reality monitoring capacity is impaired (Johnson & Raye, 1981). 
According to Johnson and Raye, one’s reality monitoring capacity, or the ability to distinguish a real 
from an imagined event, depends primarily on an evaluation of the event’s memory characteristics 
in conjunction with the judgement processes used to assess them (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993). In fact, Johnson and colleagues have shown that memories of perceived events contain more 
details and more perceptual and contextual information than memories of imagined events (e.g. 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Suengas & Johnson, 1988). Consequently, in order to 
determine whether an event was perceived or imagined, individuals principally base their 
judgements on contextual and perceptual information contained in the memory. A problem 
distinguishing a real from an imagined event could therefore be due either to poor and not very 
detailed memories of real events or to very vivid and detailed representations of imagined events. 
Concerning OCD, a number of studies have investigated motor memory and reality monitoring 
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abilities. Reed (1977, 1985), who was one of the first researchers to explore this issue, postulated 
that OCD subjects’ memory problems result from impersonal memories. That is, Reed suggested 
that checkers remember actions from the perspective of a non-participant observer and tend to rely 
on visual imagery rather than on kinaesthetic information. However, experimental explorations of 
reality monitoring and motor memory abilities have led to mixed results. Some of them revealed 
deficits in clinical or sub-clinical checkers (Ecker & Engelkamp, 1995; Sheffler Rubenstein, 
Peynircioglu, Chambless, & Pigott, 1993; Sher, Frost, Kushner, Crews, & Alexander, 1989; Sher, Frost, 
& Otto, 1983; Sher, Mann, & Frost, 1984), whereas others found no such deficit in clinical checkers 
(Brown, Kosslyn, Breiter, Baer, & Jenike, 1994; Constans, Foa, Franklin, & Mathews, 1995; Hermans, 
Martens, De Cort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Merckelbach & Wessel, 2000). 
Methodological issues may partly account for these contradictions. A recent study tried to overcome 
these limitations and evaluated memory for actions in 75 non-clinical individuals (Zermatten, Van 
der Linden, Laroi, & Ceschi, 2006). The results indicated motor memory deficits, a tendency to report 
action from the perspective of an external observer, and reality monitoring difficulties in checking-
prone participants (partly explained by a state of dissociation), confirming the memory deficit 
hypothesis. 
In another study (Zermatten, Van der Linden, D’Argembeau, & Ceschi, 2007), the authors tried to 
better understand the possible reality monitoring deficits by exploring qualitative (‘phenomenal’) 
characteristics of checkers’ representations of real and imagined events, in order to determine 
whether checkers report dim memories of real events or particularly vivid representations of 
imagined experiences. For this purpose, the authors adapted a questionnaire developed by Johnson 
et al. (1988): the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). In the MCQ, participants are 
requested to evaluate autobiographical events, and to rate these events on Likert scales assessing 
different characteristics, such as sensory details (visual, tactile, auditory, gustatory and olfactory), 
contextual information (e.g. spatial and temporal) or associated emotions. Different versions of the 
MCQ have been used in a number of studies; overall, they reveal that more sensory and contextual 
information is contained in memories of perceived events than of imagined ones, and in memories 
of positive events than of negative ones (D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003; Destun & 
Kuiper, 1999; Johnson et al., 1988; Raspotnig, 1997). 
In the modified version used (Zermatten et al., 2007), participants were requested to retrieve one 
negative, one neutral and one positive autobiographical memory, as well as to generate one 
negative, one neutral and one positive imagined experience. The characteristics explored were 
sensory details, contextual information, intensity of feelings, general vividness of the real and 
imagined events and the point of view adopted by the participants in the events they reported (i.e. 
whether they ‘saw’ the situation as if they were an external observer, saw it from their own point of 
view, or saw it from neither of these perspectives, see Nigro & Neisser, 1983). The main results for a 
sample of 79 undergraduate students indicated that non-checking-prone participants reported 
more vividness overall than checking-prone individuals. Moreover, non-checking-prone 
participants reported more visual details and more vividness for real than imagined experiences, 
while no difference between real and imagined events was found for checking-prone participants. 
One possible conclusion is that checkers might confuse real and imagined events, since both present 
the same amount of visual details and vividness. These results suggest that checking-prone 
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participants report dim memories of real events, rather than vivid memories of imagined events, 
which could partly explain their reality monitoring difficulties. No difference between groups was 
found for other characteristics, however, in particular kinaesthetic details or perspective of 
memories. This challenges Reed’s hypothesis that checkers’ memories are characterised by poor 
kinaesthetic details and an observer’s perspective. However, it is possible that impersonal 
memories tend to concern specific actions and not general events. Given this possibility, we found 
it necessary to specifically investigate memories of actions. Furthermore, the sample in the 
Zermatten et al. (2007) study was not very large (79 participants), so we wanted to explore the 
qualitative characteristics of memories for actions in a larger sample. 
The aim of the present study was thus to investigate the quality of memories for real actions in 
checking-prone individuals. More specifically, we asked participants to retrieve memories of seven 
daily actions, and to evaluate them according to several characteristics such as sensory details, 
spatial localisation, emotion, vividness and confidence. Autobiographical remembering of actions 
can be understood in the context of the autobiographical model developed by Conway (Conway, 
2005; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004), which explores the relations between autobiographical 
memory, episodic memory and the self. In Conway’s conceptualisation, autobiographical memory 
is seen as emerging from the intersection of two competing demands. The first one (‘adaptive 
correspondence’) concerns the need to encode events as a highly detailed record of reality. It allows 
one to accurately encode, for example, whether one has drunk a cup of coffee or locked the door in 
the morning, in order to avoid repeating these actions. These short episodes (lasting some seconds, 
minutes or hours) are stored in episodic memory, which also contains all the information about the 
sensory, perceptual, cognitive or affective details of these episodes. However, an efficient memory 
system cannot retain thousands of memories of everyday activities. Thus, Conway suggests that all 
recent memories are on a ‘forgetting trajectory’ and are forgotten in about 24 hours, unless they 
relate to the individual’s long-term goals. This represents the second demand of autobiographical 
memory, namely ‘coherence’. Coherence corresponds to the long-term store of memories 
consistent with the goals, self-images, attitudes, values or beliefs of an individual. If we consider 
checking in light of this model, we could postulate that the correspondence demand is deficient. 
One can, for example, postulate that the record of daily actions (such as checking) in episodic 
memory is not sufficiently precise and detailed, leading patients to repeat these actions. In our 
study, we wanted to evaluate specific details of such daily activities, and thus we were particularly 
interested in actions performed during the last 24 hours. 
In brief, our main hypothesis was that checking symptoms would be related to less detailed action 
memories, in particular concerning motor/kinaesthetic information, as postulated by Reed (1977). 
Moreover, checking symptoms would be related to a tendency to see action memories from the 
perspective of an external observer (Reed, 1977). In sum, the fact that they remember their actions 
from an observer perspective and without kinaesthetic details could lead checking-prone 
participants to doubt whether they have really performed the actions (‘did I do that or did I only 
imagine it?’), which in turn leads them to check. 
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From an original sample of 430 participants, six individuals were excluded because of extensive 
missing data. In addition, five outliers presenting clear extreme data were excluded. The final 
sample therefore included 419 volunteer participants from the community (210 females and 209 
males) aged between 20 and 35, with a mean age of 25.47 (SD = 3.92). Their mean years of education 
amounted to 14.79 (SD = 2.33). The characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1. 
For some of the analyses presented in the next section, two groups were created based on 
participants’ checking sub-scores on the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R, Foa et al., 
2002). The non-checking-prone group (N = 100) included participants within the lowest quartile of 
the distribution, that is with a checking score of 0, and a low score for washing (<2). The checking-
prone group (N = 77) consisted of individuals with a high score for checking (greater than the second 
quartile of the distribution, that is, >2) and with low scores for washing (<2). As shown in Table 1, no 
significant differences were found between the groups for age and education. However, significant 
differences were observed in terms of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, anxiety and depression. In 
addition, it should be noted that the OCI-R checking scores of our checking-prone group (M = 4.73; 
SD = 2.14) were similar to the OCI-R checking scores (M = 4.83; SD = 3.86) of a clinical OCD population 
(Foa et al., 2002). We must, anyway, mention that participants were not diagnostically evaluated for 
OCD. 
MATERIALS 
Autobiographical actions memory questionnaire 
This questionnaire was inspired by the MCQ developed by Johnson et al. (1988). In the version we 
used, participants were asked to retrieve memories of seven daily actions. More specifically, they 
had to think of the last time they had (1) brushed their teeth, (2) washed their hands, (3) gone up 
stairs, (4) put a coat on, (5) drunk something, (6) locked a door and (7) put their shoes on. If 
participants did not have any memory of the last time they had carried out one of these actions, they 
passed to the next action. The actions selected were simple everyday actions that were gender-
neutral and as universal as possible. One of the actions was more explicitly related to checking 
(locking a door). However, even actions considered to be neutral for most people may be considered 
anxiety-provoking by some checkers. Thus, in order to control for anxiety during actions, we asked 
participants to rate their anxiety for each of the actions (see below). 
At the beginning of the questionnaire, participants had to indicate the current date and time. Then, 
for each action retrieved, participants had to rate their memories along 13 dimensions. These 13 
questions concerned sensory details of the event (visual, tactile, olfactory, auditory and gustatory, 
as well as kinaesthetic details including one question about body position and one about body 
movements), information about the space in which the event took place (place and spatial 
placement of objects), emotions (a high score indicates positive emotions), anxiety provoked by the 
action (a high score indicates considerable anxiety), general vividness of the memory and 
confidence in the quality and vividness of the memory. All dimensions were rated on 7-point Likert 
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scales. Participants were then asked to indicate the perspective of their memory. Three possibilities 
were presented to participants, who had to say whether (1) they could see the situation like an 
external observer (Observer memories), (2) they could see the situation from their own viewpoint 
(Field memories) or (3) neither of these descriptions fitted their memory (Neither). Finally, 
respondents were asked to indicate the approximate time (hour and day) when each action was 
carried out. For each action, we therefore calculated how long ago (in minutes) it had been 
performed before completing the MCQ. Two versions of the questionnaire were created to vary the 
order of recall of the different actions. 
 
Table 1. Participants’ characteristics (means and standard deviations) 
 Total sample 
(N=419) 




Age 25.47 (3.92) 25.27 (3.49) 25.44 (4.05) n.s. 
Education, years 14.79 (2.33) 14.66 (2.40) 14.78 (2.32) n.s. 
Sex ratio (F/M) 210/209 43/33 47/53 — 
OCI-R 14.99 (9.25) 18.93 (7.30) 6.88 (4.44) 13.47** 
OCI-R checking 2.27 (2.35) 4.73 (2.14) 0 — 
OCI-R washing 1.16 (1.84) 0.36 (0.48) 0.16 (0.37) 3.18** 
STAI-S 33.34 (10.50) 35.92 (11.56) 29.26 (8.96) 4.23** 
STAI-T 40.41 (9.86) 43.13 (9.90) 36.04 (9.09) 4.90** 
BDI-II 8.68 (7.65) 10.18 (8.09) 6.12 (6.05) 3.81** 
Note: "p < .01. 
CP, checking-prone; NCP, non-checking-prone; OCI-R, Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised; STAI-S, 




The revised version of the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI-R, Foa et al., 2002) is an 18-item self-
report measure for assessing OCD symptoms. This version has six subscales, each containing three 
items: washing, obsessing, hoarding, ordering, checking and neutralising. Respondents have to 
indicate to what extent the situation described in each specific statement had distressed them 
during the past month on a 5-point scale (0 = not at all; 4 = extremely). Total scores range from 0 to 
72. The OCI-R has excellent psychometric properties (Foa et al., 2002). The French version of the OCI-
R used in this study has good internal consistency and has been shown to present the same factorial 
structure as the English version (Zermatten, Van der Linden, Jermann, & Ceschi, 2006). 
In addition, participants completed a questionnaire evaluating depression (Beck Depression 
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Inventory II (BDI-II), Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1998) and a questionnaire evaluating anxiety (State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI), Spielberger, 1993). 
Procedure 
For about 1 hour, participants completed the modified version of the MCQ, the OCI-R, the STAI and 
the BDI-II, as well as other questionnaires unrelated to the present study. The participants 
completed the questionnaires on a one-on-one basis with the experimenter, in a calm and neutral 
setting which did not influence the participants’ performance on the memory task. 
RESULTS 
PREPARATION OF THE DATA 
Out of the 2933 total actions (419 participants x 7 actions), 7.84% were not retrieved by the 
participants. In addition, actions carried out less than 5 minutes before the beginning of the 
questionnaire (representing 3.4% of the retrieved actions) were removed in order to exclude actions 
that might be stored in short-term memory. Moreover, we also excluded actions that were carried 
out more than 24 hours before the beginning of the questionnaire (representing 4.88% of the 
retrieved actions). This was done because we were only interested in recent memories of daily 
actions, and not in memories related to the individuals’ long-term goals, as described earlier in the 
context of Conway’s model (Conway, 2005). 
In order to explore the validity of our measures, we calculated the Cronbach’s alphas for each of the 
questionnaires we used. The coefficients indicated good internal consistency for the anxiety (STAI-
S: .94; STAI-T: .92), depression (BDI-II: .90) and OCD measures (OCI-R total score: .84; checking: .76; 
washing: .70).1 For the MCQ, we ensured that characteristics were consistent within the seven 
actions. The coefficients also indicated good consistency for the different characteristics (visual 
details: .82; tactile details: .87; body position: .89; body movements: .89; olfactory details: .76; 
auditory details: .83; gustatory details: .67; place: .68; spatial placement: .79; emotions: .84; anxiety: 
.69; vividness: .81; confidence: .87). 
MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS 
For each participant (even those with missing actions) and for each characteristic, we computed the 
mean for the seven actions. Means and standard deviations for each memory characteristic for the 
total sample are presented in Table 2. 
We first performed Pearson correlations between the measures of OCD, anxiety and depression. 
These measures were all significantly correlated, as shown in Table 3. Due to some non-normally 
distributed variables in the MCQ, Spearman correlations were then computed between the different 
memory characteristics. These correlations are presented in Table 4, and reveal that all the 
characteristics of the questionnaire significantly correlate with each other, except the anxiety 
provoked by the action, which significantly correlated with visual details, gustatory details, place, 
spatial placement of objects, emotions and confidence. 
Spearman correlations were then performed between the different memory characteristics and the 
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OCD, anxiety and depression measures in the whole sample. These correlations are reported in 
Table 5. 
The main results indicated that the checking subscale of the OCI-R was negatively correlated with 
details concerning visual characteristics, body movements, body position and confidence. The 
results also indicated a link with negative emotions and anxiety provoked by actions. The washing 
subscale was only significantly related to anxiety provoked by actions, while the OCI-R total score 
was significantly correlated with low visual details and information about body movements, 
negative emotions, high anxiety and low confidence. 
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for memory characteristics 
Total sample (N = 419) 
Visual details 5.45 (1.18) 
Tactile details 4.50 (1.41) 
Body position 4.17 (1.56) 
Body movements 4.45 (1.52) 
Olfactory details 2.53 (1.19) 
Auditory details 3.38 (1.36) 
Gustatory details 2.43 (0.84) 
Place 6.46 (0.73) 
Placement of objects 5.73 (1.05) 
Emotion 4.62 (0.91) 
Anxiety 1.28 (0.51) 
Vividness 5.20 (1.13) 
Confidence 5.67 (1.04) 
1As we will use only the washing and checking subscales of the OCI-R in this study, we report here the coefficients 
for these subscales only. 
 
Table 3. Spearman correlation coefficients between OCD, anxiety and depression measures 
 OCI-R checking OCI-R washing OCI-R STAI-S STAI-T BDI-II 
OCI-R checking —      
OCI-R washing .41** —     
OCI-R .70** .58** —    
STAI-S .25** .19** .41** —   
STAI-T .30** .24** .50** .64** —  
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BDI-II .20** .17** .43** .53** .67** — 
Note: "p < .01. 
The anxiety (STAI) and depression (BDI-II) measures were shown to be linked to high anxiety and 
negative emotions during actions. Furthermore, state anxiety (STAI-S) was negatively correlated 
with visual details, body movements information, spatial details, spatial placement of objects, 
vividness and confidence, while trait anxiety (STAI-T) was negatively related to visual and 
kinaesthetic details (concerning both body position and movements). To find out whether these 
effects were only due to the typical ‘checking’ action (‘to lock the door’), we performed the analyses 
again without this action. However, they revealed the same significant results. 
In order to see whether checking, as compared to washing, predicts poor memories of actions, we 
performed regression analyses on each of the memory characteristics with OCI-R checking and OCI-
R washing as independent variables. The results indicated that checking was a significant predictor 
of visual details (t =— 2.30, p < .05, β = —.12), body movements (t =—2.24, p < .05, β = _.12), place of 
the action (t =—2.65, p < .01, β = —.14), anxiety during the action (t = 2.18, p < .05, β = .11) and 
confidence (t = —2.56, p < .05, β = —.13). Furthermore, there was a trend towards significance for 
tactile details (t =-1.72, p = .086, β = -.09), body position (t =-1.78, p = .076, β =-.09) and vividness (t = 
—1.88, p = .06, β = —.10). As for washing, it was only a significant predictor for anxiety during actions 
(t = 2.77, p < .01, β = .14). 
We then evaluated whether checking was still a predictor of memory characteristics when anxiety 
was entered in the regression analyses. We therefore performed the analyses on each of the memory 
characteristics with OCI-R checking, OCI-R washing and STAI-T as independent variables. The results 
indicated that checking was a significant predictor of the place of the action (t =—2.33, p < .05, β = —
.13), while a trend was observed for visual details (t = —1.86, p = .06, β = —.10), body movements (t = 
—1.69, p = .09, β = —.09) and confidence (t =—1.92, p = .055, β = —.10). The STAI-T was a significant 
predictor of body position (t =—2.05, p < .05, β =—.11), emotion (t =—5.21, p < .01, β =—.27) and 
anxiety during action (t = 4.38, p < .01, β = .22), while washing was only a significant predictor for 







Table 4. Spearman correlation coefficients between the different memory characteristics 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
Visual details (A)     —             
Tactile details (B) .54** —            
Body position (C) .52** .75** —           
Body movements (D) .52**  .89** —          
Olfactory details (E) .19** .51** .41**  —         
Auditory details (F) .30** .56** .48** 49** .60** —        
Gustatory details (G)       .17** .48**  .35** .64** .45** —       
Place (H) .48** .30** * .28** .12* .21** .15** —      
Placement of objects (I) .62** .35** .35** .34** 1 /y T -T- .22** .16** .67** —     
Emotion (J) .15** .20** .20** .19** .15** .17** .10* .14** .21** —    
Anxiety (K)        -.11* .02 .02 -.01 .04 .06  -.12* -.16** -.18** —   
Vividness (L) .68** .51** .52** 49** .30** .35** ** .52** .64** .26** -.11* —  
Confidence (M) .64** .44** .42** .42** .24** .27** .24** .51** .66** .20** -.12* .78** — 




Table 5. Spearman correlation coefficients between memory characteristics and measures of OCD, anxiety and 
depression 
 OCI-R checking OCI-R washing OCI-R STAI-S STAI-T BDI-II 
Visual details -.10* -.09 -.11* -.17** -.13** -.03 
Tactile details -.06 -.01 -.03 -.07 -.08 -.01 
Body position -.11* -.05 -.08 -.09 -.14** -.06 
Body movements -.13** -.09 -.12* -.11* -.13* -.05 
Olfactory details .01 .07 .06 .03 -.00 .03 
Auditory details -.03 -.03 -.01 -.06 -.01 .00 
Gustatory details .01 .08 .07 .06 .01 .01 
Place -.07 .03 -.02 -.10* -.07 -.00 
Placement of objects -.07 -.05 -.09 -.17** -.09 -.03 
Emotion -.11* -.04 -.17** -.22** -.21** -.25** 
Anxiety .20* .15** .36** .25** .32** .31** 
Vividness -.09 -.02 -.08 -.17** -.08 -.04 
Confidence -.10* -.02 -.10* -.20** -.08 -.06 
Note: * p <.05; ** p <.01. 
 
POINT OF VIEW OF MEMORIES 
When analys the total memories retrieved, we found that participants saw 61.01% of these events 
from their own point of view (Field or F memory), 35.10% as an external observer (Observer or O 
memory), while 3.89% of the events could not be classified in either of these two categories (Neither, 
N). In order to see whether checking-prone and non-checking-prone participants presented 
different proportions of these perspectives, we computed the proportion of F, O and N memories for 
each participant. The proportion indicated more O (39.02%), fewer F (56.54%) and more N (4.43%) 
memories in checking-prone than in non-checking-prone participants (32.05% O; 65.50% F and 
2.45% N). A Chi-square analysis revealed a significant difference between groups on these 
proportions (χ22| = 9.75; p < .01). 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the characteristics of memories for different daily 
actions in a population whose checking symptoms were evaluated. Our main hypothesis was that 
checking-prone participants would report dim memories of daily actions, specifically concerning 
kinaesthetic details and would adopt the perspective of an observer when remembering such 
actions. The outcomes partly confirmed our hypotheses and can be summarised as follows. 
First, our results seem to confirm a link between checking symptoms and the tendency to report dim 
memories. Significant negative correlations were found between checking and different 
 
 
characteristics of the memories, that is, visual details, body movements and body position (i.e. 
kinaesthetic information). In addition, the regression analysis showed that checking was a 
significant predictor of visual details, body movements, place of action, confidence, while there was 
a trend towards significance for tactile details, body position and vividness. In other words, checking 
symptoms seem related to less detailed action memories. These effects were found to be specific to 
checking as compared to washing, which was not significantly related to any of the memory 
characteristics, except anxiety during actions. 
The result concerning the poor kinaesthetic information related to checking symptoms is 
particularly interesting, as it seems to confirm Reed’s (1977) suggestion that checkers rely less than 
non-checkers on kinaesthetic information when remembering actions. This also confirms that the 
results of a previous study (Zermatten et al., 2007), which found no differences between groups on 
kinaesthetic details, may be due to the nature of the memories tested (general events rather than 
actions). Concerning visual details, our findings do not support Reed’s (1977) prediction that 
checkers will rely exclusively on visual imagery when recalling an event and will favour this modality 
over kinaesthetic information. On the contrary, both modalities (visual and kinaesthetic) seem 
problematic in checking. However, this is in line with Zermatten, Van der Linden, Jermann, et al. 
(2006) and with Sher et al.’s (1989) study, which showed that checking individuals presented poor 
visual imagery when asked to report an autobiographical event such as their last holiday. 
A second main result of our study revealed significant differences between checking-prone and non-
checking-prone participants concerning the perspective of memories. When we considered the 
proportion of each of the perspectives, we observed that checking-prone participants reported 
fewer field (F) and more observer (O) memories than non-checking-prone participants. This is an 
important finding, since it seems to confirm the idea that checking-prone individuals experience a 
particular perspective in their memories for actions, as suggested by Reed (1977, 1985). This is also 
in line with an earlier study that showed a tendency to recall actions from the perspective of an 
external observer (Zermatten, Van der Linden, Laroi, et al., 2006). Furthermore, the present data 
suggest that the observer perspective of memories specifically concerns memories for actions, as 
no such differences between groups were revealed in a study on memories of general events 
(Zermatten et al., 2007). In sum, the results concerning both kinaesthetic information and the 
observer perspective seem to confirm that checkers have an impersonal way of remembering 
actions, as suggested by Reed (1977, 1985). 
Another outcome of the present study indicated that checking was related to poor confidence in the 
quality of memories. This finding is in accordance with a growing body of research suggesting that 
checkers lack confidence in their memories (e.g. MacDonald, Antony, Macleod, & Richter, 1997; Tolin 
et al., 2001). This hypothesis assumes that checkers do not have memory difficulties as such, but 
rather a lack of confidence in their memory. In our view, however, and consistent with some earlier 
data (e.g. Tuna, Tekcan, & Topcuoglu, 2005; Zitterl et al., 2001), lack of confidence and memory 
deficits are not mutually exclusive. It is therefore possible that lack of confidence and memory 
problems coexist, and even reinforce each other. One can, for example, assume that memory 
difficulties lead checkers to have less confidence in their memories. On the other hand, in 
accordance with some previous research (e.g. van den Hout & Kindt, 2003), a lack of confidence 
could lead participants to verify things again, which could in turn tarnish the memory of the 
checking action and lead to retrieval difficulties. In any case, the coexistence of lack of confidence 
 
 
and memory difficulties seems to be confirmed in the present study. Moreover, the presence of 
significant correlations between lack of confidence and memory characteristics confirms that these 
two elements are not independent. We can therefore postulate that dim memories lead to a lack of 
confidence in one’s memories. However, one could also argue that, because of their lack of 
confidence, checking-prone participants tend to underestimate the amount of details their memory 
contains. This latter hypothesis underscores the subjectivity aspect of the MCQ, which was evoked 
in a previous study (Zermatten et al., 2007). It should be recalled that the MCQ allows one to study 
the individual’s own evaluation of the memories. That is, it gives us information about the subjective 
quality of the memories, but it is not a direct measure of the memory traces as such. In sum, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that this subjective evaluation may be influenced by other factors 
such as lack of confidence or perfectionist tendencies (leading checkers to need more information 
in order to consider their memories as detailed). 
With this in mind, it would be interesting to further evaluate the quality of memories by using a more 
direct and objective measure of kinaesthetic and visual characteristics. For example, it might be 
possible to propose a paradigm in which participants have to perform actions (e.g. placing objects 
in a bookcase) in a particular context (e.g. pictures on the wall, specific objects near the bookcase). 
We could then ask participants to recall the objects they had placed in the bookcase and the 
surrounding objects, along with visual (e.g. colour, shape of the objects) or kinaesthetic (e.g. their 
position when moving the object, weight of the object) details. Finally, we could ask participants to 
complete a subjective evaluation of the quality of their memories, such as the MCQ. This kind of 
procedure would provide information concerning memory difficulties in checking and their relations 
to the subjective evaluation of memories. We are currently developing such a paradigm. 
Another point we should discuss is the role of anxiety, which seems particularly important in our 
data. That is, correlations were often stronger between the STAI and the different memory 
characteristics, or between anxiety provoked by an action and the other memory characteristics, 
than between checking and these characteristics. Moreover, when the STAI-T was entered in the 
regression analyses, it was a significant predictor of body position, emotion and anxiety during 
actions. 
It is not surprising that anxiety should influence memory. Eysenck (1983), for example, pointed out 
that anxious thoughts occupy cognitive resources, and may consequently interfere with memory 
encoding. Rachman (2002) also stressed that anxiety influences the encoding of actions, possibly 
due to the fact that the participants focus on the ‘threat’ and on their anxiety state instead of the 
contextual details of the action. It is also possible that anxiety may lead to a dissociation state during 
the performance of the action, which could prevent rich encoding (Zermatten, Van der Linden, Laroi, 
et al., 2006). Moreover, anxiety may also have an influence during the retrieval of the actions, for 
example, due to intrusive anxious thoughts interfering with the retrieval process. This possible role 
seems to be confirmed by our data showing correlations between the STAI-S (anxiety measured at 
the time of the completion of questionnaires, i.e. when the actions were retrieved) and memory 
characteristics. The question we must raise, though, is whether all memory problems in checking 
can be explained by anxiety. This is quite a difficult issue, as anxiety is intrinsic to checking (and OCD 
in general). It is thus very difficult to totally separate out the respective influences of anxiety and 
checking in our data. Nevertheless, some points may help to clarify this issue. First, we should 
emphasise that when we entered the STAI-T in the regression analyses, checking continued to be a 
 
 
significant predictor of some of the memory characteristics (place of the action, with a trend towards 
significance for visual details, body movements and confidence). In addition, if anxiety alone 
accounted for the memory problems reported in our data, it would be difficult to understand why 
checking was more specifically related to the visual and kinaesthetic details, and not to the details 
concerning the placement of objects, for example, which correlated with anxiety. Moreover, one 
must emphasise that washing symptoms were not related to the different memory characteristics, 
although washing was significantly correlated with anxiety. In sum, these results seem to indicate 
that there is a specific relationship between checking and memory characteristics, in addition to the 
influence of anxiety. Further work will need to re-examine this issue to shed more light on these 
complex relations. 
Finally, it appears that depression was not significantly correlated with the memory characteristics 
(except emotions and anxiety during actions). That is, our results showing dim memories in 
checking-prone participants do not seem to be attributable to the presence of depression, in which 
a deficit of specificity, leading depressive individuals to retrieve more general and less detailed 
autobiographical memories, has been described (e.g. Barnhofer, de Jong-Meyer, Kleinpass, & 
Nikesch, 2002; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
Before concluding, we should point out the main limitation on our work, namely the relatively small 
effects we observed. In this regard, we should emphasise that the impersonal memories for action 
suggested by our data constitute only one of the numerous factors implicated in checking, such as 
anxiety, dissociation, sense of responsibility, lack of confidence and perfectionism. Further studies 
will have to clarify the respective roles of all these factors in order to better understand the multi-
determined nature of checking. Memories for autobiographical actions will also have to be explored 
in a clinical population to find out whether these effects are maximised. Anyway, as our sample 
presented OCI-R checking scores similar to those of clinical groups (Foa et al., 2002), we cannot rule 
out the possibility that some of our participants already presented clinical OCD. 
In conclusion, this study principally highlighted the lack of visual, kinaesthetic and spatial details in 
memories for actions, the observer perspective and the lack of memory confidence that characterise 
checkers. These results support the idea that checking-prone participants have impersonal 
memories for actions, which may explain why they find it problematic to be sure of whether they 
really performed an action or only imagined it. We also showed that anxiety played an important 
role in our results and that further work is needed to see to what extent it could explain checkers’ 
memory difficulties. Taken as a whole, these outcomes represent an important step in the study of 
the mechanisms underlying checking. 
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